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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
which is not effected within the legally circumscribed area of pro-
priety, whereby the arrest becomes illegal, endows the victim with
a right to resist-by using reasonably sufficient force to prevent the
offense against his person.
7
People v. Cherry8 involved a concededly illegal arrest by
police officers, one of whom was attacked by the victim biting his
thumb in an effort to avoid such arrest. The Appellate Division,
affirming a finding by the court below that defendant was guilty
of assault, third degree,9 in that he employed more force than
was necessary or sufficient- to prevent the offense committed upon
him, was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The majority opinion
by Judge Fuld was to the effect that since the officers were guilty
of an illegal arrest,' and the defendant was thereby empowered
to use sufficient force to prevent that improper detention,10 1 de-
fendant's bite did not constitute an assault, either as a revengeful
counter-attack, or vindictive infliction of needless injury, regard-
less of the fact that the officers displayed their badges before mak-
ing such arrest.
The dissenting opinion by Judge Desmond, in which Judge
Froessel concurred, is based on the premise that since the court
below found that defendant did use more force than was necessary
for the purpose, which finding was affirmed by the Appellate Divi-
sion, the latter authorized to pass on facts unlike the Court of
Appeals, a reversal would be justified only if as a matter of law
the defendant did not use more force than was reasonably neces-
sary under the circumstances.'0 2
After Trial
a. Legality of Judgment-Habeas corpus: Does the omission
of a direction by the trial court for the enforcement of paymenL
of a fine, which fine was a part of an original sentence including
imprisonment, render the judgment on which the sentence is im-
posed defective? This question was presented to the Court of
Appeals in People ex rel. Sedotto v. Jackson,0 where the relator,
who had been convicted of perjury, first degree, 0 4 instituted habeas
97. PENAL LAw § 246.
98. 307 N. Y. 308, 121 N. E. 2d 238 (1954).
99. 282 App. Div. 948, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 654 (2d Dep't 1953).
100. See note 96 su~ra.
101. See note 98 supra at 310, 121 N. E. 2d 238, 239.
102. Id., at 315-317, 121 N. E. 2d 238, 243; see, e. g., People v. Murray, 54 Hun
406, 7 N. Y. Supp. 548 (1889) ; Magar v. Hammond, 183 N. Y. 387, 390, 76 N. E. 474,
475 (1906).
103. 307 N. Y. 291, 121 N. E. 2d 229 (1954).
104. PENAL LAW § 1633 (1) provides the punishment for perjury, first degree:
"Perjury in the first degree and subornation of perjury in the first degree are felonies
and are punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or by a fine
of not more than $5,000, or by both."
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corpus proceedings °5 to test the legality of the judgment by which
he was imprisoned. He was sentenced to a term in state prison
and fined the sum of $5,000. Following the imposition of sentence
and imprisonment it was discovered that although a fine was re-
corded in the confinement papers as a part of the sentence, no
provision was included to indicate how the fine was to be imple-
mented in lieu of payment. The relator was thereupon resentenced
to the same penal exactions with an amendment that in lieu of
payment of fine he was to serve one extra year of imprisonment
to run consecutively to sentence imposed, nuno pro tune as of the
date of the original sentence.
" Special Term sustained the writ and relator was ordered dis-
charged from custody. The Appellate Division reversed the order
on the law, dismissed the writ and remanded relator to prison,
concluding that the amendment upon resentence was related to a
separable part of the judgment, a method of enforcing the fine
that did not change or affect the prison term which prisoner had
already commenced;108 but that the omission of an alternative to
the payment of the fine in the original judgment was a "defect in
the judgment. 10 7 On this basis, it appears that the implementa-
tion effect of the amendment upon resentence constituted a valid
correction of an erroneous sentence after its commencement.'
08
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Appellate Division
that the omission from the original sentence of the alternative
provision in lieu of payment of the fine made the judgment defec-
tive and remitted the matter to Special Term. The court relied on
the language of Section 718 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
which provides for the imposition of an alternative in lieu of pay-
ment of a fine in terms which are permissive, not mandatory.0 9
Hence the omission did not void the original sentence.1 On the
premise that the original sentence was not defective, but rather
105. See the discussion of the writ of habeas corpus, and its limitations in New
York in 1 BFLo. L. Rav. 268 (1952).
106. See PENAL LAW § 2188 which provides that once imprisonment has begun
under a judgment, it shall not be interrupted. See also Matter of Cedar, 240 App. Div.
182, 269 N. Y. Supp. 733 (1st Dep't 1934).
107. 283 App. Div. 540, 541, 128 N. Y. S. 2d 872, 873 (3d Dep't 1954).
108. See People ex reL Mendola v. Murphy, 237 App. Div. 529, 261 N. Y. Supp.
315 (2d Dep't 1932) ; People ex rel. Miresi v. Murphy, 253 App. Div. 441, 2 N. Y. S.
2d 731 (3d Dep't 1938).
109. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 718 provides: "A judgment that the defendant pay a
fine may also direct that he be imprisoned until the fine be satisfied; specifying the extent
of the imprisonment, which cannot exceed one day for every one dollar of the fine
See also CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 484.
110. People v. Robarge, 142 Misc. 457, 462, 255 N. Y. Supp. 448, 454 (Sup. Ct.
1932), aff'd, 235 App. Div. 896, 257 N. Y. Supp. 1002 (4th Dep't 1932) ; City of Buffalo
v. Murphy, 228 App. Div. 279, 287, 239 N. Y. Supp. 206, 216 (4th Dep't 1930) ; see also
Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler, 298 U. S. 460 (1936).
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a valid exercise of judicial discretion, the trial court was without
authority to vacate the sentence and impose , new one of the same
penal exactions with an amendment corrective of an illusory er-
ror."' Upon remission of the matter to Special Term, the court
called attention to the application of Section 220 of the Correction
Law.
1 2
b. Requirements of appeal from Courts of Special Sessions:
In People v. Omans,"3 the Court of Appeals negatively answered
the question whether a non-compliance with the proper provision
of the Code of Criminal Procedure1 14 was curable by resort to
Section 524-a of the Code which permits the court to which a,e'l
is taken to supply omissions inadvertently or excusably made.
Defendant, who was convicted of speeding"' by a court of
Snecial Sessions sought to perfect his appeal by serving a notice
of appeal on the Justice of the Peace, the District Attorney, and
County Clerk. Prior to appellate argument before County Court,
the District Attorney appeared specially to dismiss the .npn'l
because defendant had not served an affidavit of errors as
required of appeals from courts of special sessions."0 Defendant
endeavored to cure his defect pursuant to Section 524-a of the
Code,"' but County Court denied his application.
The Court of Appeals, affirming the denial, pointed out (1)
that Section 524-a, contained in Part IV of the Code is explicitly
applicable only to proceedings in criminal actions prosecuted by
indictments, whereas Section 751 is contained in Part V, which i.i
applicable to proceedings in courts of -pecial sessions and police
courts, which proceedings are usually brought on the basis of a
complaint or information. Part V, therefore, has a system of
procedure completely independent of Part I-V, unless specially
provided otherwise."' There being no other provision in either
111. E. g., People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Orange Co. Ct., 271 N. Y. 151, 156-157,
2 N. E. 2d 521, 523-524 (1936) ; Schenectady Trust Co. v. Emmons, 290 N. Y. 225. 229,
48 N. E. 2d 497, 499 (1943) ; see also United States v. Murray, 275 U. S. 347, 358 (1928).
112. CoRRc.rloN LAW § 220 contains the provisions and limitations for discharge
from parole.
113. 306 N. Y. 379. 118 N. E. 2d 566 (1954).
114. CODE CRIM. PROc. § 751.
115. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 56 (1).
116. See note 114 supra; cf. People v. Belcher, 299 N. Y. 321, 87 N. E. 2d 278
(1949).
117. CODE CRIM. PRoC. § 524-a provides: "Where appellant, seasonably and in
good faith, serves a notice of appeal, either upon the clerk with whom the judgment roll
is filed, or upon the District Attorney of the county in which the judgment was
rendered, but omits through mistake or inadvertence or excusable neglect, to serve it
upon the other, or to do any other act necessary to perfect the appeal . . . the court, in or
to which the appeal is taken, upon proof by affidavit of facts, may permit, in its discre-
tion, the omission to be supplied . ... "
118. See People v. Giles, 152 N. Y. 136, 138, 46 N. E. 326, 327 (1897).
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part which may be construed as making Section 524-a referable to
the procedure prescribed in Section 751, the provision for cure is
inapplicable.119 And the court further pointed out (2) that under
Section 524-a, the express relation to the correction of eriors in
a case is confined to those instances where appeal is perfected by
service of notice of appeal, whereas Section 751 expressly provides




At common law, communications made by a patient to his
physician for the purpose of receiving medical aid, even though
made in the strictest confidence, were not privileged.' Conse-
quently in 1828 the Legislature enacted what is now Section 352
of the Civil Practice Act, which created a privilege between phy-
sician and patient. This section provides, "a person duly author-
ized to practice physic or surgery, or dentistry, or a registered
professional or licensed practical nurse, shall not be allowed to
disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient
in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable
him to act in that capacity . . ."
Courts construed this statute so as to preclude a physician
from testifying even as to knowledge gained from observation
of his patient's appearance during the period of attendance.2
However a doctor could testify concerning the condition of a
person where he did not attend him professionally. 3
Judge Earl in Renihan v. Dennin,4 commented on this con-
struction and said "It is probably true that the statute, as we feel
obligated to construe it, will work considerable mischief. In
testamentary cases, where the contest relates to the competency
of the testator it will exclude evidence of physicians, which is
generally the most important and decisive . . . But the remedy is
with the Legislature and not with the courts." Judge Earl later
119. See People v. Cornell, 186 Misc. 825, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 835 (Delaware County
Ct. 1946).
1. Dutchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 613 (1776) ; Edington v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 564, 569 (1879).
2. Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 185 (1876) ; Grattan v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 281 (1880) ; Renihan v. Dennin, 103 N. Y. 573, 9 N. E.
320 (1886).
3. Edington v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 564 (1879).
4. 103 N. Y. 573. 580. 9 N. E. 320. 322 (1886).
